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Abstract
We study the problem of finding “fair” stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with
Incomplete lists (smi). For an instance I of smi there may be many stable matchings, providing
significantly different outcomes for the sets of men and women. We introduce two new notions
of fairness in smi. Firstly, a regret-equal stable matching minimises the difference in ranks of a
worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. Secondly, a min-regret sum
stable matching minimises the sum of ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among
all stable matchings. We present two new efficient algorithms to find stable matchings of these
types. Firstly, the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm finds a regret-equal stable matching in
O(d0nm) time, where d0 is the absolute difference in ranks between a worst-off man and a worst-off
woman in the man-optimal stable matching, n is the number of men or women, and m is the total
length of all preference lists. Secondly, the Min-Regret Sum Algorithm finds a min-regret sum stable
matching in O(dsm) time, where ds is the difference in the ranks between a worst-off man in each
of the woman-optimal and man-optimal stable matchings. Experiments to compare several types
of fair optimal stable matchings were conducted and show that the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration
Algorithm produces matchings that are competitive with respect to other fairness objectives. On
the other hand, existing types of “fair” stable matchings did not provide as close an approximation
to regret-equal stable matchings.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms
Keywords and phrases Stable marriage; Algorithms; Optimality; Fair stable matchings; Regret-
equality; Min-regret sum
Related Version arxiv.org/abs/2001.10875
Supplement Material zenodo.org/record/3630383 and zenodo.org/record/3630349
Funding Frances Cooper : Supported by an Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
Doctoral Training Account
David Manlove: Supported by Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant EP/P028306/01
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was first introduced by Gale and Shapley [5] in their
seminal paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”, and comprises a set of
men and a set of women, where each man has a strict preference over all women and vice
versa. A matching in this setting is an assignment of men to women such that no man or
woman is multiply assigned. A stable matching is then a matching in which there is no
man-woman pair who would rather be assigned to each other than to their assigned partners.
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2 Algorithms for new types of fair stable matchings
In this paper we study an extension of sm, known as the Stable Marriage problem
with Incomplete lists (smi). An instance I of smi comprises two sets of agents, men
U = {m1,m2, ...,mn} and women W = {w1, w2, ..., wn}. Each man (woman) ranks a subset
of women (men) in strict preference order. Let m be the total length of all preference lists.
A man mi finds a woman wj acceptable if wj appears on mi’s preference list. Similarly, a
woman wj finds a man mi acceptable if mi appears on wj ’s preference list. A pair (mi, wj)
is acceptable if mi finds wj acceptable and wj finds mi acceptable. A matching M in this
context is an assignment of men to women comprising acceptable pairs such that no man
or woman is assigned to more than one person. Given a matching M , denote by M(mi)
the woman mi is assigned to in M (or if mi is unassigned then M(mi) is undefined); the
notation M(wj) is defined similarly for a woman wj . A pair (mi, wj) is a blocking pair if
1) (mi, wj) is an acceptable pair, 2) mi is unmatched or prefers wj to M(mi), and 3) wj is
unmatched or prefers mi to M(wj). Matching M is stable if it has no blocking pair.
In smi, a stable matching always exists, and may be found in linear time using the
Man-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm or the Woman-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm [5].
The Man-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm produces the man-optimal stable matching, that
is, the unique stable matching in which each man is assigned their most-preferred woman in
any stable matching. Unfortunately, the man-optimal stable matching is also woman-pessimal
i.e., each woman is assigned their least-preferred man in any stable matching. Similarly
the Woman-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm produces the woman-optimal (man-pessimal)
stable matching.
Let I be an instance of smi and n be the number of men or women in I. Let M be
the set of all stable matchings in I, which may be exponential in size [11]. We note that
by the “Rural Hospitals” Theorem [6], the same set of men and women are assigned in all
stable matchings ofM. Thus in order to simplify future descriptions, we are able to use the
Man-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm to find and remove all unassigned men and women
from I prior to any other operation. Without loss of generality, we assume that from this
point onwards, all men and women in I are assigned in any stable matching of I.
For an instance of smi, it is natural to wish to find a stable matching inM which is in some
sense fair for both sets of men and women. The rank of mi with respect toM is defined as the
location of M(mi) on mi’s preference list, and is denoted rank(mi,M(mi)). An analogous
definition of rank(wj ,M(wj)) holds for a woman wj . We define the man-degree dU (M) of
M as the largest rank of all men in M , that is, dU (M) = max{rank(mi,M(mi)) : mi ∈ U}.
Again an analogous definition of dW (M) holds for women. Define the degree pair of M ,
denoted d(M) = (a, b) as the tuple of man- and woman-degrees in M , where a = dU (M) and
b = dW (M). The man-cost cU (M) of matching M is defined as the sum of ranks of all men,
that is, cU (M) =
∑
mi∈U rank(mi,M(mi)). A similar definition of cW (M) holds for women.
Finally, the degree of a matching M is given by d(M) = max{dU (M), dW (M)} and the cost
of matching M is given by c(M) = cU (M) + cW (M).
We now define four notions of fairness in the smi context. Given a stable matching M ,
define its balanced score to be max{cU (M), cW (M)}. M is balanced [4] if it has minimum
balanced score over all stable matchings inM. Feder [4] showed that the problem of finding
a balanced stable matching in smi is NP-hard, although can be approximated within a
factor of 2. This approximation factor was improved to 2− 1l , where l is the length of the
longest preference list, by Eric McDermid as noted in Manlove [15, pg. 110]. Gupta et al. [7]
showed that a balanced stable matching can be found in O(f(n)8t) time when parameterised
by t = k −min{cU (M0), cW (Mz)}, where f(n) is a function polynomial in n and k is the
balanced score. The sex-equal score of M is defined to be |cU (M)− cW (M)|. M is sex-equal
F. Cooper and D. Manlove 3
[9] if it has minimum sex-equal score over all stable matchings inM. Finding a sex-equal
stable matching was shown to be NP-hard by Kato [13]. This result was later strengthened
by McDermid and Irving [16] who showed that, even in the case when preference lists have
length at most 3, the problem of deciding whether there is a stable matching with sex-equal
score 0 is NP-complete. Additionally, a polynomial-time algorithm to find a sex-equal stable
matching is described for instances in which men have preference lists of length at most 2
(women’s preference lists remaining unbounded) [16]. A stable matching M is egalitarian
[14] if c(M) is minimum over all stable matchings inM, and may be found in O(m1.5) time
[4]. Finally, a stable matching M is minimum regret [14] if d(M) is minimum among all
stable matchings inM. It is possible to find a minimum regret stable matching in O(m)
time [8]. These definitions of fairness are summarised in Table 1.
Cost Degree
Minimising the
maximum
min
M∈M
max{cU (M), cW (M)} min
M∈M
max{dU (M), dW (M)}
Balanced stable matching [4] Minimum regret stable matching [14]
Minimising the
absolute
difference
min
M∈M
|cU (M)− cW (M)| min
M∈M
|dU (M)− dW (M)|
Sex-equal stable matching [9] Regret-equal stable matching *
Minimising the
sum
min
M∈M
(cU (M) + cW (M)) min
M∈M
(dU (M) + dW (M))
Egalitarian stable matching [14] Min-regret sum stable matching *
Table 1 Commonly used definitions of fair stable matchings in smi. Our contributions are labelled
with an *.
In Table 1 there are two new natural definitions of fairness that can be studied.
We define the regret-equality score r(M) as |dU (M)−dW (M)| for a given stable matching
M . M is regret-equal if r(M) is minimum, taken over all stable matchings inM. Note
that in general we will prefer a regret-equal stable matchingM such that dU (M)+dW (M)
is minimised (e.g. d(M) = (3, 3) rather than d(M) = (10, 10)).
We define the regret sum as dU (M) + dW (M) for a given stable matching M . M is
min-regret sum if dU (M) + dW (M) is minimum taken over all stable matchings inM.
1.2 Motivation
Matching algorithms are widely used in the real world to solve allocation problems based on
smi and its variants. A famous example of this is the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP). This scheme has been running in the US since 1952, and involves the allocation
of thousands of graduating medical students to hospitals [18]. Other matching schemes
involve the allocation of students to projects [2] and the allocation of kidney donors to kidney
patients [3].
Let mentees take the place of men and mentors take the place of women. Thus, mentees
(mentors) rank a subset of mentors (mentees) and may only be allocated one mentor (mentee)
in any matching. If we used the (renamed) Mentee-Oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm [5] to
find a stable matching of mentees to mentors, then we would find a mentee-optimal stable
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matching M . However, as previously discussed, this would also be a mentor-pessimal stable
matching. A similar but reversed situation happens using the (also renamed) Mentor-Oriented
Gale-Shapley Algorithm [5]. Therefore we may wish to find a stable matching that is in some
sense fair between mentees and mentors using some of the criteria described in the previous
section. All the types of fair stable matchings described in Table 1 are viable candidates.
However, as previously described, each of the problems of finding a balanced stable matching
or a sex-equal stable matching is NP-hard, and there are existing polynomial time algorithms
in the literature to find only two types of fair stable matchings, namely an egalitarian stable
matching (in O(m1.5) time) [4] and a minimum regret stable matching (in O(m) time) [8].
Therefore, additional definitions of new, fair stable matchings and polynomial-time algorithms
to calculate them provide additional choice for a matching scheme administrator.
Moreover, we may be interested in finding a measure that gives a worst-off mentee
a partner of rank as close as possible to that of a worst-off mentor. However, from our
experimental work in Section 5, we found that there was no other type of optimal stable
matching that closely approximates the regret-equality score of the regret-equal stable
matching. Indeed, results show that there exist regret-equal stable matchings with balanced
score, cost and degree that are close to that of a balanced stable matching, an egalitarian
stable matching and a minimum regret stable matching, respectively. This motivates the
search for efficient algorithms to produce a regret-equal stable matching that has “good”
measure relative to other types of fair stable matching.
Whilst the practical motivation for studying min-regret sum stable matchings may not
be as strong as in the regret-equality case, theoretical motivation comes from completing the
study of the algorithmic complexity of computing all types of fair stable matchings relative
to cost and degree, as shown in Table 1.
1.3 Contribution
In this paper, we present two efficient algorithms: one to find a regret-equal stable matching,
and one to find a min-regret sum stable matching, in an instance I of smi. Let M0 and
Mz be the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings in I. First we present the
Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm (REDI), to find a regret-equal stable matching in
an instance I of smi, with time complexity O(d0nm), where d0 = |dU (M0)− dW (M0)|. This
is the main result of the paper. Second we present the Min-Regret Sum Algorithm (MRS), to
find a min-regret sum stable matching in an instance I of smi, with time complexity O(dsm),
where ds = dU (Mz) − dU (M0). In addition to this theoretical work, the REDI algorithm
was implemented and its performance was compared against an algorithm to enumerate all
stable matchings [8] (exponential in the worst case). Finally, experiments were conducted
to compare six different types of optimal stable matchings (balanced, sex-equal, egalitarian,
min-regret, regret-equal, min-regret sum), and output from Algorithm REDI, over a range
of measures (including balanced score, sex-equal score, cost, degree, regret-equality score,
regret sum). In addition to the observations already discussed in Section 1.2, we found a
large variation in sex-equal scores and regret-equality scores among the six different types of
optimal stable matching, and, a far smaller variation for the balanced score, cost, degree
and regret sum measures. This smaller variation also includes outputs of Algorithm REDI,
indicating that we are able to find a regret-equal stable matching in polynomial time with a
likely good balanced score, cost and degree using this algorithm. Indeed, we find in practice
that Algorithm REDI approximates these types of optimal stable matchings at an average of
9.0%, 1.1% and 3.0% over their respective optimal values, for randomly-generated instances
with n = 1000.
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1.4 Structure of the paper
Section 2 describes a rotation and related concepts in smi that will be used later in the
paper. Sections 3 and 4 describe Algorithm REDI and Algorithm MRS respectively, giving in
each case pseudocode, correctness proofs and time complexity calculations. An experimental
evaluation is given in Section 5. Finally, future work is presented in Section 6.
2 Structure of stable matchings
For some stable matching M in an instance I of smi, let s(mi,M) denote the next woman on
mi’s preference list (starting from M(mi)) who prefers mi to M(s(mi,M)) (their partner in
M). A rotation ρ is then a sequence of man-woman pairs {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), ..., (mq, wq)}
in M , such that mi+1 = M(s(mi,M)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q where addition is taken modulo q
[12]. We say rotation ρ is exposed on M if {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), ..., (mq, wq)} ⊆ M . If ρ is
exposed on M , we may eliminate ρ on M , that is, remove all pairs of ρ from M and add
pairs (mi, wi+1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, where addition is taken modulo q, in order to produce another
stable matching M ′ of I. The rotation poset Rp(I) of I indicates the order in which rotations
may be eliminated. Rotation ρ is said to precede rotation τ if τ is not exposed until ρ has
been eliminated. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of stable matchings
and the set of closed subsets of Rp(I) [12, Theorem 3.1]. Gusfield and Irving [9] describe a
graphical structure known as the rotation digraph Rd(I) of I which is based on Rp(I) and
allows for the enumeration of all stable matchings in O(m+ n|M|) time.
Let R be the set of rotations of I. Then Rj(M) is the set of rotations that contain
a women of rank j in M , that is, Rj(M) = {σ ∈ R : (m,w) ∈ σ ∧ rank(w,M(w)) = j)}.
Let Mz be the woman-optimal stable matching [5]. For any stable pair (mi, wj) /∈Mz, let
φ(mi, wj) denote the unique rotation containing pair (mi, wj). Finally, denote by c(ρ) the
closure of rotation ρ and similarly denote by c(R′) the closure of set of rotations R′. We say
that the closure of an undefined rotation or an empty set of rotations is the empty set.
3 Algorithm to find a regret-equal stable matching in SMI
3.1 Description of the Algorithm
Algorithm REDI, which finds a regret-equal stable matching in a given instance I of smi, is
presented as Algorithm 1. For an instance I of smi, Algorithm REDI begins with operations
to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings, M0 and Mz, found using the
Man-oriented and Women-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm [5]. The set of rotations R is
also found using the Minimal Differences Algorithm [12].
Let d(M0) = (a0, b0). If a0 = b0 then we must have an optimal stable matching and so
we output M0 on Line 5. If a0 > b0 then any other matching M ′, where d(M ′) = (a′, b′),
must have a′ ≥ a0 and b′ ≤ b0 since any rotation (or combination of rotations) eliminated
on the man-optimal matching M0 will make men no better off and women no worse off.
Therefore M0 is optimal and so it is returned on Line 5. Now suppose a0 < b0. Throughout
the algorithm we save the best matching found so far to the variable Mopt starting with M0.
We know that a matching exists with d0 = b0 − a0 and so we try to improve on this, by
finding a matching M with r(M) < d0.
We create several ‘columns’ of possible degree pairs of a regret-equal matching as follows.
The top-most pairs for columns k ≥ 1 are given by the sequence(
(a0, b0), (a0 + 1, b0), (a0 + 2, b0), ..., (min{n, 2b0 − a0 − 1}, b0)
)
.
6 Algorithms for new types of fair stable matchings
The sequence of pairs for column k (1 ≤ k ≤ min{2d0, n− a0 + 1}) from top to bottom
is given by(
(a0+k− 1, b0), (a0+k− 1, b0− 1), (a0+k− 1, b0− 2), ..., (a0+k− 1,max{a0−d0+k, 1})
)
.
At this point as long as the size n of the instance satisfies n ≥ 2b0−a0−1 and a0−d0+1 ≥ 1,
the possible degree pairs of a regret-equal matching are shown in Figure 3 of Appendix A.1.
We know this accounts for all possible degree pairs since, as above, if M ′ is any matching not
equal to M0, where d(M ′) = (a′, b′), it must be that a′ ≥ a0 and b′ ≤ b0. Setting b′ = b0, the
largest a′ could be is given by b0 added to the maximum possible improved difference d0 − 1,
that is, a′ = b0 + d0 − 1 = 2b0 − a0 − 1. If n < 2b0 − a0 − 1 then we only consider the first
n− a0 + 1 columns in Figure 3. The a0 − d0 + k value is obtained by noting that if x is the
final value of women’s degree for the column sequence above then a0+ k− 1−x = d0− 1 and
so x = a0 + k − d0. Figure 4 of Appendix A.1 shows an example of the possible regret-equal
degree pairs when d(M0) = (2, 6) and n ≥ 9.
The column operation (Algorithm 2) works as follows. Let local variable M hold the
current matching for this column, and let local variable Q be the set of rotations corresponding
to M . Iteratively we first test if r(M) < r(Mopt) setting Mopt to M if so. We now check
whether dU (M) ≥ dW (M). If it is, then any further rotation for this column will only make
r(M) larger, and so we stop iterating for this column, returning Mopt. Next, we find the
set of rotations Q′ in the closure of Rb(M) ⊆ R that are not already eliminated to reach
M . If eliminating these rotations would either increase the men’s degree or not decrease the
women’s degree, then we return Mopt. Otherwise, set M to be the matching found when
eliminating these rotations.
If after the column operation, dU (Mopt) = dW (Mopt), then we have a regret-equal
matching and it is immediately returned on Lines 10 or 24 of Algorithm 1.
The column operation described above is called first from the man-optimal stable matching
M0 on Line 8, to iterate down the first column. Then for each man mi we do the following.
Let M be set to M0. Iteratively we eliminate (mi,M(mi)) from M by eliminating rotation
ρ and its predecessors (not already eliminated to reach M) such that (mi,M(mi)) ∈ ρ. We
continue doing this until the men’s degree increases and rank(mi,M(mi)) = dU (M). This
has the effect of jumping our focus from some column of possible degree pairs, to another
column further to the right with mi being one of the lowest ranked men in M . Once we
have moved to a new column we perform the column operation described above. If either
mi has the same partner in M as in Mz (hence there are no rotations left that move mi) or
dU (M) > dW (M) (further rotations will only increase the regret-equality score), then we stop
iterating for mi. In this case we restart this process for the next man, or return Mopt if we
have completed this process for all men. Note that since at the end of a while loop iteration,
if r(M) = 0 then Mopt is returned, it is not possible for the condition dU (M) = dW (M) to
ever be satisfied in the while loop clause.
3.2 Correctness proof and time complexity
In this section we state the correctness and time complexity results for Algorithm REDI.
The proofs of these theorems may be found in Appendix A.2.
I Theorem 2. Let I be an instance of smi. Any matching produced by Algorithm REDI is a
regret-equal stable matching of I.
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Algorithm 1 REDI(I), returns a regret-equal stable matching for an instance I of smi.
Require: An instance I of smi.
Ensure: Return a regret-equal stable matching Mopt.
1: M0 ← MGS(I) . M0 is the man-optimal stable matching found using the Man-oriented
Gale-Shapley Algorithm (MGS) [5].
2: Mz ← WGS(I) . Mz is the woman-optimal stable matching found using the
Woman-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm (WGS) [5].
3: R← MIN-DIFF(I) . R is the set of rotations found using the Minimal Differences
Algorithm (MIN-DIFF) [12].
4: if dU (M0) ≥ dW (M0) then
5: return M0
6: end if
7: Mopt ←M0 . Mopt is the best stable matching found so far.
8: Mopt ←REDI-COL(I,M0, ∅,Mopt) . Find the best matching for the first column.
9: if r(Mopt) = 0 then
10: return Mopt
11: end if
12: for each mi ∈ U do . For each man.
13: M ←M0 . M is the matching we start from for mi at the beginning of each column.
14: Q← ∅ . Q is the set of rotations corresponding to M .
15: while (mi,M(mi)) /∈Mz and dU (M) < dW (M) do
16: ρ = φ(mi,M(mi))
17: a← dU (M)
18: Q′ ← c(ρ)\Q
19: M ←M/Q′ . Rotations in Q′ are eliminated in order defined by the rotation
poset of I.
20: Q← Q ∪Q′
21: if dU (M) > a and rank(mi,M(mi)) = dU (M) then . The men’s degree has
increased and mi is a worst ranked man in M .
22: Mopt ←REDI-COL(I,M,Q,Mopt) . Find the best matching for this column.
23: if r(Mopt) = 0 then
24: return Mopt
25: end if
26: end if
27: end while
28: end for
29: return Mopt
I Theorem 3. Let I be an instance of smi. Algorithm REDI always terminates within
O(d0nm) time, where d0 = |dU (M0)− dW (M0)|, n is the number of men or women in I, m
is the total length of all preference lists and M0 is the man-optimal stable matching.
3.3 Regret-equal stable matchings with minimum cost
We may seek a regret-equal stable matching with minimum cost over all regret-equal stable
matchings. This may be achieved in O(nm2.5) time using the following process.
We define the deletion of pair (mi, wj) as the removal of wj from mi’s preference list
and the removal of mi from wj ’s preference list. Truncating men’s preference lists at t,
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Algorithm 2 REDI-COL(I,M,Q,Mopt), subroutine for Algorithm 1. Column operation for the
current column dU (M). Returns Mopt, the best stable matching found so far (according to the
regret-equality score).
Require: An instance I of smi, stable matching M , the closure of M , Q and Mopt the best
stable matching found so far (according to the regret-equality score).
Ensure: Finds the best stable matching (according to the regret-equality score) found when
incrementally eliminating women of worst rank from the current matching, without
increasing the men’s degree. If an improvement is made then Mopt is updated. Mopt is
returned. All variables used within Algorithm 2 are understood to be local.
1: a← dU (M)
2: while true do
3: if r(M) < r(Mopt) then
4: Mopt ←M
5: end if
6: if dU (M) ≥ dW (M) then . Further rotations for this column would only increase
the difference in degree of men and women.
7: return Mopt
8: end if
9: b← dW (M)
10: Q′ ← c(Rb(M))\Q
11: if dU (M/Q′) > a ∨ dW (M/Q′) = b then
12: return Mopt
13: else
14: M ←M/Q′ . Rotations in Q′ are eliminated in order defined by the rotation
poset of I.
15: Q← Q ∪Q′
16: end if
17: end while
where 1 ≤ t ≤ n, is then the process of deleting pair (mi, wj) for each (mi, wj) such that
rank(mi, wj) > t. An analogous definition holds for women. For a given SMI instance I, first
find the regret-equality score r of the regret-equal stable matching using Algorithm REDI
in O(d0nm) time. Then, iterate over all possible man-woman degree pairs (a, b) such that
|a− b| = r (there are O(n) such pairs). For each such degree pair (a, b), truncate men at a
and women at b, creating instance I ′. Then, for each of the O(m) man-woman pairs (mi, wj)
in I ′, fix mi with his ath-choice partner and wj with her bth-choice partner (where ranks are
taken with respect to instance I), if possible. If this is not possible then continue to the next
degree pair. Assume that w′j is mi’s ath-choice partner, and m′i is wj ’s bth-choice partner.
In I ′, we now delete pairs (m′′i , w′′j ) for any w′′j such that mi prefers w′′j to w′j and w′′j prefers
mi to m′′i . Also delete the pair (m′′i , w′′j ) for any m′′i such that wj prefers m′′i to m′i and m′′i
prefers wj to w′′j . Next we delete all remaining preference list elements of mi except w′j and
all remaining preference list elements of wj except m′i. The Gale-Shapley Algorithm is run to
check that a stable matching of size n exists in I ′. If no such stable matching exists then we
move on to the next degree pair. Feder’s Algorithm may then be used to find an egalitarian
stable matching in the reduced smi instance I ′ in O(m1.5) time (using the original ranks in
I as costs). This makes a total of O(nm2.5) time to find a regret-equal stable matching with
minimum cost.
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4 Algorithm to find a min-regret sum stable matching in SMI
Algorithm MRS, which finds a min-regret sum stable matching, given an instance of smi, is
presented as Algorithm 3. First, the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings, M0
and Mz, are found using the Man-oriented and Women-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithms
[5]. The best matching found so far, denoted Mopt is initialised to M0. We then iterate over
each possible man degree a between dU (M0) and dU (Mz) inclusive, where an improvement
of Mopt, according to the regret sum, is still possible. As an example, suppose Mopt has a
regret sum of 5 with dU (Mopt) = 2 and dW (Mopt) = 3. Then, it is not worth iterating over
any man degree greater than 3 since it will not be possible to improve on the regret sum of 5
by doing so. For each iteration of the while loop, we truncate the men’s preference lists at a,
and find the woman-optimal stable matching MTz for this truncated instance. If the regret
sum of MTz is smaller than that of Mopt, we update Mopt to MTz . After all iterations over
possible men’s degrees are completed, Mopt is returned.
Algorithm 3 MRS(I), returns a min-regret sum stable matching for an instance I of smi
Require: An instance I of smi.
Ensure: Return a min-regret sum stable matching Mopt.
1: M0 ← MGS(I) . M0 is the man-optimal stable matching found using the Man-oriented
Gale-Shapley Algorithm (MGS) [5].
2: Mz ← WGS(I) . Mz is the woman-optimal stable matching found using the
Woman-oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm (WGS) [5].
3: Mopt ←M0
4: a← dU (M0)
5: while a ≤ dU (Mz) and a+ 1 < dU (Mopt) + dW (Mopt) do
6: IT ←instance I where men’s preference lists are truncated at rank a.
7: MTz ← WGS(IT )
8: if dU (MTz ) + dW (MTz ) < dU (Mopt) + dW (Mopt) then
9: Mopt ←MTz
10: end if
11: a← a+ 1
12: end while
13: return Mopt
Let ds denote the difference between the degree of men in the woman-optimal stable
matching Mz, and in the man-optimal stable matching M0, that is ds = dU (Mz)− dU (M0).
Theorem 5 as follows states that Algorithm MRS produces a min-regret sum stable matching
in O(dsm) time. See Appendix B for the proof of this Theorem.
I Theorem 5. Let I be an instance of smi. Algorithm MRS produces a min-regret sum
stable matching in O(dsm) time, where ds = dU (Mz)− dU (M0), m is the total length of all
preference lists, and M0 and Mz are the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings
respectively.
5 Experiments
5.1 Methodology
An Enumeration Algorithm (ENUM) exists to find the set of all stable matchings of an
instance I of smi in O(m+ n|M|) time [8]. Within this time complexity, it is possible to
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output a regret-equal stable matching from this set of stable matchings, by keeping track of
the best stable matching found so far (according to the regret-equality score) as they are
created. We randomly generated instances of sm, in order to compare the performance of
Algorithms REDI and ENUM. Using output from Algorithm ENUM, we also investigated the
effect of varying instance sizes, for six different types of optimal stable matchings (balanced,
sex-equal, egalitarian, min-regret, regret-equal, min-regret sum), and also output from
Algorithm REDI, over a range of measures (including balanced score, sex-equal score, cost,
degree, regret-equality score, regret sum). Tests were run over 19 different instance types with
varying instance size (n ∈ {10, 20, ..., 100, 200, ..., 1000}). All instances tested were complete
with uniform distributions on preference lists. Experiments were run over 500 instances of
each instance type.
Each instance was run over the two algorithms described above with a timeout time
of 1 hour for each algorithm. No instances timed out for these experiments. Experiments
were conducted on a machine running Ubuntu version 18.04 with 32 cores, 8×64GB RAM
and Dual Intel® Xeon® CPU E5-2697A v4 processors. Instance generation, correctness and
statistics summarisation programs, and plot and LATEX table generation were all written in
Python and run on Python version 3.6.1. All other code was written in Java and compiled
using Java version 1.8.0. Each instance was run on a single thread with 16 instances run in
parallel using GNU Parallel [19]. Serial Java garbage collection was used with a maximum
heap size of 2GB distributed to each thread. Code and data repositories for these experiments
can be found at zenodo.org/record/3630383 and zenodo.org/record/3630349 respectively.
Comprehensive correctness testing was conducted, a description of which may be seen in
Appendix C.1.
5.2 Experimental results summary
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the time taken to execute the two algorithms over increasing
values of n. Precise data for this plot can be seen in Table 2 of Appendix C.2 which gives the
mean, median, 5th percentile and 95th percentile durations for Algorithms REDI and ENUM.
In Figure 1, the median values of time taken for each algorithm are plotted and a 90%
confidence interval is displayed using the 5th and 95th percentile measurements. Additional
experiments and evaluations not discussed here may also be found in Appendix C.3.
Figure 2 shows comparisons of six different types of optimal stable matchings (balanced,
sex-equal, egalitarian, min-regret, regret-equal, min-regret sum), and output from Algorithm
REDI, over a range of measures (including balanced score, sex-equal score, cost, degree,
regret-equality score, regret sum), as n increases. Optimal stable matching statistics involving
a measure determined by cost (respectively degree) are given a green (respectively blue)
colour. For a particular fairness objective A and a particular fairness measure B, there may
be a set of several stable matchings that are optimal with respect to A. In this case we choose
a matching from this set that has best possible measure with respect to B. For example,
if we are looking at the regret-equality score, for a particular instance, we find a sex-equal
stable matching that has smallest regret-equality score (over the set of all sex-equal stable
matchings) and use this value to plot the regret-equality score for this type of optimal stable
matching. This process is replicated for the other types of optimal stable matching. In each
case the mean measure value is plotted for the given type of optimal stable matching. Data
for these plots may be found in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Appendix C.2.
The main results of these experiments are:
Time taken: It is clear from Figure 1 in that Algorithm REDI is the faster algorithm in
practice, taking approximately 2s to solve an instance of size n = 1000 with very little
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Figure 1 A log plot of the time taken to execute Algorithms REDI and ENUM. A second order
polynomial model has been assumed for best-fit lines.
variation. In contrast, Algorithm ENUM takes around 8s for an instance of size n = 1000
with a far larger variation.
Sex-equal score: A wide variation in sex-equal score over the six optimal matchings
can be seen in Figure 2b (and Table 4). Sex-equal and balanced stable matchings are
extremely closely aligned giving a mean sex-equal score of 265.0 and 284.0 respectively
for the instance type with n = 1000. Min-sum regret stable matching, on the other hand,
performed the least well with a mean sex-equal score of 12400.0 for the same instance
type.
Regret-equality score: Similar to the previous point we see a wide variation in regret-
equality score over the six optimal stable matchings in Figure 2e (and Table 7). For the
instance type with n = 1000, this ranges from a mean regret-equality score of 14.2 for
the regret-equal stable matching to 84.6 for the minimum regret stable matching. It is
interesting to note that the type of optimal stable matching (out of the six optimal stable
matchings tested) whose regret-equality score tends to be furthest away from that of a
regret-equal stable matching is the min-regret sum stable matching. This may be due
to the fact that minimising the sum of two measures does not necessarily force the two
measures to be close together.
Output from Algorithm REDI: Due to the wide variation of regret-equality scores among
different types of optimal stable matchings (as described above) it is clear that no other
optimal stable matching is able to closely approximate a regret-equal stable matching,
which highlights the importance of Algorithm REDI that is designed specifically for
optimising this measure. Interestingly, Algorithm REDI is also competitive in terms
of balanced score, cost and degree. Indeed, we can see from Tables 3, 5 and 6, that
Algorithm REDI approximates these types of optimal stable matchings at an average of
9.0%, 1.1% and 3.0% over their respective optimal values, for instances with n = 1000.
Over all instance sizes, these values are within ranges [4.0%, 10.9%], [1.1%, 3.4%] and
[1.3%, 3.7%], respectively. This gives a good indication of the high-quality of output from
this algorithm even on seemingly unrelated measures.
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(a) Plot of balanced score.
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(b) Plot of sex-equal score.
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(c) Plot of cost.
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(d) Plot of degree.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
n
0
20
40
60
80
Re
gr
et
-e
qu
al
 sc
or
e
Balanced
Sex-equal
Egalitarian
Minimum regret
Regret-equal
Min-regret sum
Algorithm REDI
(e) Plot of regret-equality score.
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(f) Plot of regret sum.
Figure 2 Plots of experiments to compare six different optimal stable matchings (balanced,
sex-equal, egalitarian, min-regret, regret-equal, min-regret sum), and output from Algorithm REDI,
over a range of measures (including balanced score, sex-equal score, cost, degree, regret-equality
score, regret sum). A second order polynomial model has been assumed for all best-fit lines.
6 Future work
We introduced two new notions of fair stable matchings for smi, namely, the regret-equal
stable matching and the min-regret sum stable matching. We presented algorithms that
are able to compute matchings of these types in polynomial time: O(d0nm) time for the
regret-equal stable matching, where d0 = |dU (M0) − dW (M0)|; and O(dsm) time for the
min-regret sum stable matching, where ds = dU (Mz) − dU (M0). It remains open as to
whether these time complexities can be improved.
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A Algorithm REDI supplement
This appendix section presents supplementary information for Algorithm REDI.
A.1 Regret-equal degree tuples
Figure 3 shows the possible degree pairs of a regret-equal stable matching in the general case. Figure 4 shows the possible degree pairs for a
regret-equal stable matching where d(M0) = (2, 6) and n ≥ 9.
r(M) Degree pairs (dU (M), dW (M))
k 1 2 ... b0 − a0 b0 − a0 + 1 b0 − a0 + 2 ... 2b0 − 2a0 − 1 2b0 − 2a0
d0 = b0 − a0 (a0, b0)
b0 − a0 − 1 (a0, b0 − 1) (a0 + 1, b0)
... ... ...
1 (a0, a0 + 1) (a0 + 1, a0 + 2) ... (b0 − 1, b0)
0 (a0, a0) (a0 + 1, a0 + 1) ... ... (b0, b0)
1 (a0, a0 − 1) (a0 + 1, a0) ... ... ... (b0 + 1, b0)
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
b0 − a0 − 2 (a0, a0 − d0 + 2) (a0 + 1, a0 − d0 + 3) ... ... ... ... ... (2b0 − a0 − 2, b0)
b0 − a0 − 1 (a0, a0 − d0 + 1) (a0 + 1, a0 − d0 + 2) ... ... ... ... ... ... (2b0 − a0 − 1, b0)
Figure 3 Possible regret-equal degree tuples for men and women when d(M0) = (a0, b0), n ≥ 2b0 − a0 − 1 and a0 − d0 + 1 ≥ 1.
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r(M) Degree pairs (dU (M), dW (M))
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
d0 = 4 (2, 6)
3 (2, 5) (3, 6)
2 (2, 4) (3, 5) (4, 6)
1 (2, 3) (3, 4) (4, 5) (5, 6)
0 (2, 2) (3, 3) (4, 4) (5, 5) (6, 6)
1 (2, 1) (3, 2) (4, 3) (5, 4) (6, 5) (7, 6)
2 (3, 1) (4, 2) (5, 3) (6, 4) (7, 5) (8, 6)
3 (4, 1) (5, 2) (6, 3) (7, 4) (8, 5) (9, 6)
Figure 4 Possible regret-equal degree tuples for men and women when d(M0) = (2, 6) and n ≥ 9.
A.2 Correctness proof
Theorem 2, with accompanying Proposition 1, shows that Algorithm REDI always produces
a regret-equal stable matching. Theorem 3 shows that Algorithm REDI runs in O(d0nm)
time.
I Proposition 1. Let I be an instance of smi and let M and M ′ be stable matchings in I
where for each man mi ∈ U , rank(mi,M(mi)) ≤ rank(mi,M ′(mi)) and dU (M) = dU (M ′).
Let Q and Q′ denote the set of rotations eliminated from M0 to reach M and M ′ respectively.
Then stable matching M ′′ with d(M ′′) = d(M ′) may be found by ensuring all rotations in
Rd = c({ρ ∈ R : ∃(m,w) ∈ ρ where dW (M) ≥ rank(w,m) > dW (M ′)}\Q) are eliminated
from M . Figure 5 shows a summary of degree pairs for M , M ′ and M ′′ in the general case.
Proof. First, since rank(mi,M(mi)) ≤ rank(mi,M ′(mi)) and each rotation must make some
man worse off, we know that each rotation in Q must be eliminated to reachM ′ and therefore
Q ⊆ Q′. Second, we also know that any rotation containing a woman at rank larger than
dW (M ′) must be eliminated from M in order to reach M ′ (additional rotations may also
have been eliminated). But these are precisely the rotations in Rd, hence Rd ⊆ Q′. Let M ′′
be the stable matching found when eliminating Rd on M and let Q′′ = Q ∪Rd denote the
unique set of rotations corresponding to M ′′. Then Q′′ ⊆ Q′ since Q ⊆ Q′ and Rd ⊆ Q′.
We observe the following.
Since Q ⊆ Q′′, it must be that dU (M) ≤ dU (M ′′), and as dU (M) = dU (M ′), it follows
that dU (M ′) ≤ dU (M ′′);
Q∪Rd is the set of all rotations with pairs containing women of rank larger than dW (M ′).
Since Q′′ = Q ∪Rd and all rotations in Q′′ are eliminated on M0 to reach M ′′, it must
be the case that dW (M ′′) ≤ dW (M ′);
Since Q′′ ⊆ Q′, it must be that dU (M ′′) ≤ dU (M ′) and dW (M ′′) ≥ dW (M ′).
Hence d(M ′′) = d(M ′) as required. J
I Theorem 2. Let I be an instance of smi. Any matching produced by Algorithm REDI is a
regret-equal stable matching of I.
Proof. There are four points in Algorithm 1’s execution where we return a matching, namely
Lines 5, 10, 24 and 29. First we show that if M is a matching returned at any of these points
then M is stable. Next we look at each of these points where a matching may be returned
and show they are regret-equal stable matchings.
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(a0 + k − 1, b0)
(a0 + k − 1, b0 − 1)
(a0 + k − 1, b0 − 2)
...
d(M)
...
d(M ′) = d(M ′′)
...
(a0 + k − 1,max{a0 − d0 + k, 1})
Figure 5 Degree pairs in column k = dU (M) for instance I, built as per the description in Section
3.1.
Let M be the matching returned at any of the four points above. Then M is stable
since it is found by iteratively eliminating sets of rotations that form closed subsets of the
rotation poset of I (on Line 19 of Algorithm 1 and Line 14 of Algorithm 2) starting from
the man-optimal stable matching (created on Line 1). Since there is a 1-1 correspondence
between closed subsets of the rotation poset and the set of all stable matchings [12, Theorem
3.1], M is a stable matching.
Let M1 be a matching that is returned by Line 5. Since M1 has been returned by Line 5
it must be that dU (M1) ≥ dW (M1) and therefore by the same reasoning given in the second
paragraph of Section 3.1, M1 is a regret-equal stable matching.
Let M2 be a matching that is returned by either Line 10 or Line 24. To be returned at
these points r(M2) = 0 and therefore M2 is a regret-equal stable matching.
Let M3 be a matching that is returned by Line 29 and let M ′ be a regret-equal stable
matching such that dU (M ′) is minimum over all regret-equal stable matchings. We will prove
that r(M3) = r(M ′) by showing it will not have been possible for us to miss a stable matching
with regret-equality score equal to r(M ′) during the algorithm’s execution. First we show
that the column operation (Algorithm 2) must be executed for column dU (M ′). Then, we
show that during this column operation Mopt will be updated such that r(Mopt) = r(M ′).
Since M ′ is not returned on Line 5, M ′ 6= M0. If dU (M ′) = dU (M0) then clearly
the column operation is executed on Line 8 for column dU (M ′). Assume therefore that
dU (M ′) 6= dU (M0). Without loss of generality let {m1,m2...,mk} be the set of men who
are at rank dU (M ′) in M ′. We enter the while loop on Line 15 for each man mj ∈
{m1,m2...,mk}. M is initialised to M0. Successively, the algorithm eliminates all rotations
in c(φ(mj ,M(mj))) that are not yet eliminated until M(mj) = M ′(mj). This must be
possible since (mj ,M ′(mj)) ∈M ′ and M ′ is a stable matching in I. During the while loop
iteration that rotates mj down to their M ′(mj) partner, it is not necessarily the case that
the current matching M updates its man-degree to dU (M ′) at this point. This is because
although dU (M) = dU (M ′), an earlier movement of mj in a previous while loop iteration
may have brought some other man in {m1,m2...,mk} down to their partner in M ′ already.
Note that it is not possible for a man to overshoot column dU (M ′) when moving mj down
to their M ′(mj) partner since the set of rotations we have eliminated to bring mi down to
M ′(mi) is a subset of the rotations corresponding to M ′. However, for at least one of these
men mi ∈ {m1,m2...,mk}, the while loop iteration that moves mi down to M ′(mi) will also
lead to dU (M) increasing to the same value as dU (M ′). Assume we are beginning the while
loop iteration on Line 15 for man mi. Let M = M0. We continue eliminating rotations
that have not yet been eliminated in c(φ(mi,M(mi))) until M(mi) =M ′(mi). Our choice
F. Cooper and D. Manlove 17
of mi ensures that the movement of mi to their M ′(mi) partner occurs at the same time
as dU (M) increases to dU (M ′) and so we satisfy the conditions on Line 21 to perform the
column operation (Algorithm 2) on M for column dU (M ′).
From above we know that the column operation (Algorithm 2) will be executed for
column dU (M ′). Either we start this column operation with M0, or we have only eliminated
the minimum number of rotations necessary to take mi down to M ′(mi) from M0. In
either case we know that rank(ml,M(ml)) ≤ rank(ml,M ′(ml)) for all ml ∈ U . For this
column a regret-equal stable matching may be found with degree pairs that are either
(dU (M ′), dU (M ′)+r(M ′)) or (dU (M ′), dU (M ′)−r(M ′)). The degree of matchingM ′ is given
by one of the above pairs, but it may be possible for regret-equal stable matchings to exist in I
with both of the above degree pairs. Assume firstly that d(M ′) = (dU (M ′), dU (M ′)+ r(M ′)).
The algorithm will attempt to successively eliminate from M rotations containing women of
rank dW (M). By Proposition 1, since rank(mi,M(mi)) ≤ rank(mi,M ′(mi)) for all mi ∈ U
and dU (M) = dU (M ′), we know the algorithm will continue this process until M is updated
to a regret-equal stable matching with d(M) = d(M ′) and so Mopt will be set to M with
r(Mopt) = r(M ′). Assume then that d(M ′) = (dU (M ′), dU (M ′) − r(M ′)), where a regret-
equal stable matching may or may not exist with degree (dU (M ′), dU (M ′) + r(M ′)). Then
similar to before, the algorithm successively eliminates fromM rotations containing women of
rank dW (M). This may result in a regret-equal stable matching M being found with d(M) =
(dU (M ′), dU (M ′)+r(M ′)) in which caseMopt will be set toM with r(Mopt) = r(M ′). Assume
this is not the case. Then, by Proposition 1, since rank(mi,M(mi)) ≤ rank(mi,M ′(mi)) for
all mi ∈ U and dU (M) = dU (M ′), we know the algorithm will continue eliminating rotations
containing women of rank dW (M) until M is updated to a regret-equal stable matching with
d(M) = d(M ′) and so Mopt will be set to M with r(Mopt) = r(M ′) as above.
Therefore any matching returned by Algorithm REDI is a regret-equal equal stable
matching. J
I Theorem 3. Let I be an instance of smi. Algorithm REDI always terminates within
O(d0nm) time, where d0 = |dU (M0)− dW (M0)|, n is the number of men or women in I, m
is the total length of all preference lists and M0 is the man-optimal stable matching.
Proof. The for loop on Line 12 of Algorithm 1 iterates over all men, n times, where n is
the number of men or women. During the nested while loop on Line 15, each man mi may
be rotated down their preference list on Line 19, dU (Mz) − dU (M0) + 1 = 2d0 − 1 times
(the number of possible columns k from Figure 3). Rotations are eliminated on Line 19 of
Algorithm 1 and Line 14 of Algorithm 2 successively, beginning at the man-optimal stable
matching M0, meaning O(m) rotations are eliminated in total for each while loop iteration
at Line 15 of Algorithm 1. This may also be viewed as O(m) man-woman pair changes since
the number of possible man-woman pairs in I is O(m) and each pair existing in the set of
rotations is unique. Therefore Algorithm REDI runs in O(d0nm) time and since preference
lists of men and women are finite, the algorithm terminates. J
B Algorithm MRS correctness and time complexity proof
Theorem 5 provides the correctness proof and time complexity analysis for Algorithm MRS.
In Lemma 4 and Theorem 5 we will use the following notation and terminology. Let I be
an instance of smi. Let IT be the truncated instance of I, created on Line 6 of Algorithm
3, where men are truncated below rank a. Let MT be the set of stable matchings in IT .
Finally, let reduced(M) = {M ∈M : ∀(mi, wj) ∈M, rank(mi, wj) ≤ a}.
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I Lemma 4. MT = reduced(M).
Proof. Let stable matching M ′ of size n exist in MT . If we transform IT to I then we
are adding preference list pairs (mi, wj) where rank(mi, wj) > rank(mi,M ′(mi)). But then,
(mi, wj) cannot constitute a blocking pair and so M ′ must be stable in I with M ′ ∈M. Also,
since M ′ is in IT it must be the case that rank(mi, wj) ≤ a. HenceMT ⊆ reduced(M).
Let stable matching M ′′ exist in reduced(M). By the definition of reduced(M) and IT
all pairs in M ′′ must exist in preference lists of the truncated instance IT . If we transform
I to IT we will only be removing some pairs from preference lists that do not exist in M ′′.
Therefore since we are only removing pairs, it is not possible to introduce pairs into IT that
would block M ′′ and so M ′′ is stable in IT . HenceMT ⊇ reduced(M).
ThereforeMT = reduced(M), as required. J
I Theorem 5. Let I be an instance of smi. Algorithm MRS produces a min-regret sum
stable matching in O(dsm) time, where ds = dU (Mz)− dU (M0), m is the total length of all
preference lists, and M0 and Mz are the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings
respectively.
Proof. Let M be a min-regret sum stable matching in I with dU (M) minimum among all
min-regret sum stable matchings. We show that it is not possible to miss a stable matching
M ′ with d(M ′) = d(M), during the execution of Algorithm MRS. On Line 5 of Algorithm 3,
we iterate over all possible men’s degrees that may correspond to a min-regret sum stable
matching, and will enter the while loop for degree value a = dU (M). Since a = dU (M), we
know that M ∈ reduced(M) and so by Lemma 4, M ∈ MT . We also know by Lemma 4,
that MTz ∈ M. Let R′ and RTz be the set of rotations associated with M and MTz in I.
On Line 7 of the algorithm we find the woman-optimal stable matching MTz in MT and
so we must have rank(wj ,MTz (wj)) ≤ rank(wj ,M(wj)), for all women wj , since M ∈ MT .
From this inequality, we know R′ ⊆ RTz , and since dU (M) = a it must be that dU (MTz ) = a.
Additionally, this inequality implies dW (MTz ) ≤ dW (M). As M is a min-regret sum stable
matching, there cannot be a stable matching with man degree a and woman degree < dW (M),
but as dW (MTz ) ≤ dW (M), we must have dW (MTz ) = dW (M). Hence, d(MTz ) = d(M).
Note that due to the choice of M , with dU (M) minimum among all min-regret sum stable
matchings, it is not possible for Mopt to be updated to a min-regret stable matching prior
to this point in the algorithm. Therefore, Mopt is updated to MTz on Line 9. Additionally,
as Mopt is now a min-regret stable matching it will not be possible for it to be updated to
another stable matching after this point, and so Mopt is returned on Line 13, as required.
Truncation of our instance requires only a single pass through preference lists of men and
women and is therefore an O(m) operation. The man-optimal and woman-optimal stable
matchings can found in O(m) time both within and outwith the while loop. Since the number
of potential men’s degrees that we iterate over is bounded by ds = dU (Mz)− dU (M0), we
have an overall time complexity of O(dsm) for Algorithm MRS. J
C Experiments supplement
C.1 Correctness testing
Correctness tests were run in the following way. In addition to the 19 generated instance
types described in Section 5, a further two instance types were generated where n ∈ {6, 8},
with 5000 instances for each type. Over all instances of the 21 instance types, each matching
output by an algorithm (one for Algorithm REDI, and multiple for the Algorithm ENUM),
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was tested for (1) capacity: each man (woman) may only be assigned to one woman (man)
respectively; and (2) stability: no blocking pair exists. Additionally, the regret-equality score
of the stable matchings output by each of the algorithms were compared against each other
to ensure they were identical values. These tests were were written in Java and compiled
using Java version 1.8.0. Finally, for all instances types where n ≤ 50, further correctness
testing was conducted on the Algorithm ENUM to ensure that the correct number of stable
matchings was produced. This was done using an Integer Programming (IP) model built
using the IP modelling framework PuLP (version 1.6.9) [17] running CPLEX (version 12.8.0)
[10] with Python version 2.7.15. Similar to above, all instances were run on a single thread
with 16 instances run in parallel using GNU Parallel [19]. A timeout time of 30 minutes was
applied to each instance for the PuLP program, and all instances completed within the time
limit. All correctness tests passed successfully.
C.2 Experiments figures and tables
This appendix section presents tables referred to in Section 5. Instance types are labelled
according to n, e.g., S100 is the instance type containing instances where n = 100. Table 2
provides data for Figure 1. Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 provide data for the plots in Figure 2.
Case REDIav REDImed REDI5 REDI95 ENUMav ENUMmed ENUM5 ENUM95
S10 204.9 206.0 180.0 226.0 244.8 244.0 215.9 270.0
S20 214.3 215.0 191.0 236.0 256.1 257.0 227.9 283.0
S30 220.7 221.5 195.0 243.0 264.0 265.5 236.0 288.0
S40 234.1 235.0 208.0 255.0 279.9 281.0 248.0 305.0
S50 237.1 238.0 213.0 259.0 288.7 289.0 260.0 317.0
S60 252.5 253.5 229.0 276.0 311.3 312.0 281.0 340.0
S70 261.3 262.0 234.0 284.0 320.5 321.0 285.0 353.0
S80 269.7 270.0 246.0 294.0 334.5 334.0 296.9 373.0
S90 288.4 290.0 262.0 312.0 360.9 360.0 325.0 400.0
S100 290.7 291.0 259.9 321.0 369.3 369.5 329.0 412.0
S200 362.4 354.0 315.0 441.0 533.5 514.0 420.9 695.3
S300 447.1 440.0 425.0 494.0 789.1 751.0 606.9 1047.1
S400 541.3 540.0 520.0 562.0 1278.7 1127.0 891.9 2136.6
S500 697.6 698.0 662.9 734.0 1961.7 1761.5 1201.4 3156.3
S600 965.6 968.0 925.9 1010.0 2835.6 2546.0 1767.9 4707.9
S700 1154.3 1160.0 1080.0 1219.0 3986.8 3194.5 2218.7 7620.5
S800 1396.7 1402.0 1312.0 1485.0 5708.3 4496.5 2801.7 12450.0
S900 1701.9 1712.0 1585.9 1836.0 9043.3 5958.0 3439.9 20366.2
S1000 2087.9 2112.0 1855.0 2293.0 11802.0 8092.5 4234.8 28824.8
Table 2 A comparison of time taken to execute Algorithm REDI and Algorithm ENUM. Here
REDIav, REDImed, REDI5 and REDI95 represent the mean, median, 5th percentile and 95th
percentile of Algorithm REDI for a given instance type. Similar notation is used for Algorithm
ENUM. Times are in ms.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 32.1 32.1 33.3 32.8 32.8 35.6 33.4
S20 90.5 90.9 95.1 94.2 94.0 104.5 96.9
S30 165.6 166.2 177.5 174.9 176.5 199.4 181.5
S40 254.9 255.8 273.0 270.7 270.2 312.7 278.4
S50 357.2 358.3 382.0 378.9 379.5 439.8 393.0
S60 466.4 467.7 495.5 495.5 496.5 573.3 516.2
S70 588.8 590.8 626.5 626.2 629.1 739.3 651.4
S80 720.1 722.3 769.7 764.9 769.9 901.8 798.9
S90 861.1 863.3 921.7 906.6 914.9 1054.9 952.7
S100 1004.7 1007.2 1073.4 1062.7 1063.1 1245.0 1103.2
S200 2844.8 2849.2 3000.2 3014.6 3008.9 3553.4 3134.9
S300 5224.1 5230.1 5510.4 5488.6 5550.5 6348.2 5741.3
S400 8036.5 8045.4 8471.1 8503.0 8541.4 9743.7 8835.2
S500 11215.7 11223.6 11740.4 11891.9 11857.3 13577.3 12352.0
S600 14757.4 14770.0 15423.7 15474.0 15543.2 18188.9 16061.1
S700 18576.7 18590.2 19407.7 19525.4 19553.7 22512.5 20217.5
S800 22718.1 22731.4 23707.2 23851.3 23975.3 27652.9 24824.3
S900 27098.2 27113.3 28198.3 28678.0 28667.4 32719.2 29707.8
S1000 31684.8 31702.0 32976.9 33364.7 33393.2 38599.1 34551.0
Table 3 Mean balanced score for six different optimal stable matchings and output from Algorithm
REDI.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 5.4 5.3 8.9 7.0 6.5 12.2 7.6
S20 10.5 10.0 22.7 17.8 16.7 36.2 21.6
S30 13.9 13.1 43.7 32.1 32.6 75.8 41.2
S40 17.4 16.1 63.2 48.8 44.0 121.8 58.7
S50 22.6 21.5 84.3 65.1 63.2 169.8 87.3
S60 25.2 23.1 98.8 80.7 77.8 213.6 113.1
S70 27.9 25.5 121.4 99.8 98.8 290.9 139.2
S80 29.8 27.6 149.6 118.0 118.5 347.5 170.1
S90 36.8 33.5 182.8 125.6 134.0 378.8 201.5
S100 36.0 32.6 200.8 150.1 141.1 456.9 213.7
S200 71.9 66.4 440.8 399.6 369.1 1306.0 598.0
S300 101.9 92.1 762.3 616.6 709.7 2067.9 1060.2
S400 135.3 126.2 1117.8 1017.1 1061.0 3131.9 1595.2
S500 154.8 142.5 1345.4 1431.4 1343.2 4322.4 2255.0
S600 188.3 173.4 1694.3 1562.5 1641.7 6111.8 2596.3
S700 223.3 207.4 2071.3 2014.9 2053.9 7077.1 3268.0
S800 233.0 215.2 2437.2 2388.6 2597.4 8836.2 4164.2
S900 256.0 240.1 2705.8 3227.4 3179.2 10125.8 5077.3
S1000 284.0 265.0 3147.4 3438.4 3454.8 12400.0 5583.6
Table 4Mean sex-equal score for six different optimal stable matchings and output from Algorithm
REDI.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 58.6 59.0 57.7 58.3 58.8 58.9 59.1
S20 170.3 171.7 167.4 169.5 170.7 172.2 172.2
S30 316.9 319.4 311.3 315.5 319.3 322.5 321.8
S40 492.1 495.5 482.7 488.7 493.6 502.4 498.0
S50 691.5 695.0 679.7 687.9 692.6 708.1 698.8
S60 907.2 912.3 892.1 903.2 909.7 930.1 919.4
S70 1149.3 1156.1 1131.7 1145.4 1154.5 1185.7 1163.7
S80 1410.2 1417.1 1389.8 1403.3 1415.2 1452.9 1427.7
S90 1684.8 1693.2 1660.6 1675.1 1687.7 1727.1 1703.8
S100 1973.3 1981.8 1945.9 1963.4 1976.0 2028.7 1992.6
S200 5617.4 5632.0 5559.5 5601.3 5625.2 5790.9 5671.9
S300 10346.3 10368.1 10258.5 10314.5 10358.0 10611.2 10422.3
S400 15937.5 15964.5 15824.3 15932.0 15978.1 16332.6 16075.3
S500 22276.4 22304.7 22135.5 22276.0 22308.6 22800.7 22449.0
S600 29326.0 29366.7 29153.0 29297.7 29371.4 30233.8 29525.9
S700 36929.9 36972.9 36744.2 36933.6 36975.4 37910.1 37167.1
S800 45203.0 45247.6 44977.2 45195.9 45264.7 46423.0 45484.3
S900 53940.0 53986.4 53690.7 54003.9 54053.3 55265.3 54338.2
S1000 63085.6 63139.0 62806.5 63145.7 63204.4 64752.1 63518.5
Table 5 Mean cost for six different optimal stable matchings and output from Algorithm REDI.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.7
S20 14.4 14.5 14.3 13.5 13.8 14.1 13.8
S30 21.0 21.4 20.7 19.3 19.8 20.2 19.9
S40 26.7 27.1 26.1 24.3 25.1 25.7 25.2
S50 31.7 32.0 31.2 28.7 29.5 30.4 29.6
S60 36.6 37.0 35.5 33.1 34.1 35.1 34.2
S70 41.2 41.9 40.6 37.4 38.5 39.8 38.6
S80 45.1 45.6 44.6 41.1 42.4 44.0 42.5
S90 49.1 49.7 48.2 44.6 45.9 47.2 46.1
S100 53.4 54.1 52.0 48.1 49.7 51.2 49.9
S200 87.5 88.0 85.2 79.3 82.0 84.8 82.2
S300 116.5 117.5 114.0 104.3 107.3 110.8 107.3
S400 139.2 139.6 136.8 125.5 129.1 133.4 129.3
S500 160.9 161.2 159.8 146.7 151.1 154.4 151.1
S600 182.1 182.6 178.7 166.0 170.8 177.0 170.9
S700 198.5 198.9 197.4 181.8 186.8 191.9 186.8
S800 217.7 218.6 214.3 197.9 202.2 210.7 202.5
S900 239.6 239.4 235.7 215.6 222.4 228.7 222.5
S1000 252.7 253.7 252.2 232.5 239.5 246.3 239.5
Table 6 Mean degree for six different optimal stable matchings and output from Algorithm
REDI.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.5 2.7 1.5
S20 3.2 3.3 4.1 2.6 2.2 5.2 2.2
S30 5.1 5.2 6.3 3.5 2.9 8.2 2.9
S40 6.2 6.3 7.5 4.3 3.2 10.6 3.2
S50 7.2 7.2 8.5 4.7 3.6 12.3 3.6
S60 8.2 8.4 9.4 5.5 4.0 14.1 4.0
S70 9.2 9.5 11.0 6.1 4.0 16.5 4.0
S80 9.5 9.6 11.9 6.4 4.3 18.1 4.3
S90 10.1 10.4 12.0 6.0 4.2 18.1 4.2
S100 11.1 11.2 13.1 7.1 4.7 20.1 4.7
S200 16.5 16.9 18.4 10.7 6.9 33.4 6.9
S300 23.7 24.0 25.7 13.3 8.7 39.6 8.7
S400 25.4 25.7 28.3 14.9 9.0 46.0 9.0
S500 28.0 27.9 30.8 17.9 10.8 52.3 10.8
S600 31.0 30.9 34.5 18.6 11.3 63.7 11.3
S700 32.2 32.3 36.1 20.4 12.2 63.2 12.2
S800 37.0 37.2 39.0 21.1 13.9 71.3 13.9
S900 42.7 41.8 45.5 24.7 14.3 77.0 14.3
S1000 40.4 40.1 45.9 25.9 14.2 84.6 14.2
Table 7 Mean regret-equality score for six different optimal stable matchings and output from
Algorithm REDI.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Algorithm
REDI
S10 13.8 14.0 13.3 13.1 13.9 12.9 13.9
S20 25.5 25.8 24.5 23.6 25.3 22.9 25.5
S30 36.9 37.6 35.0 33.4 36.8 32.3 36.9
S40 47.2 47.8 44.6 42.3 47.0 40.8 47.1
S50 56.3 56.7 53.7 50.2 55.3 48.4 55.5
S60 64.9 65.6 61.5 57.9 64.2 56.0 64.4
S70 73.3 74.3 70.1 65.6 73.0 63.1 73.1
S80 80.7 81.6 77.0 72.5 80.4 69.8 80.8
S90 88.1 89.0 84.3 79.2 87.6 76.3 87.9
S100 95.7 96.9 90.8 85.4 94.8 82.3 95.1
S200 158.4 159.2 151.7 142.1 157.0 136.3 157.4
S300 209.4 210.9 202.2 187.6 205.8 182.0 206.0
S400 252.9 253.4 245.3 227.6 249.2 220.7 249.6
S500 293.8 294.5 288.8 265.2 291.4 256.5 291.5
S600 333.1 334.2 322.8 300.9 330.3 290.3 330.5
S700 364.8 365.6 358.8 330.0 361.3 320.6 361.4
S800 398.3 400.0 389.6 363.3 390.5 350.0 391.1
S900 436.5 436.9 426.0 391.4 430.5 380.3 430.8
S1000 465.0 467.3 458.5 420.9 464.7 408.0 464.9
Table 8 Mean regret sum for six different optimal stable matchings and output from Algorithm
REDI.
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C.3 Additional experiments and evaluations
This appendix section describes further experiments and evaluations not referred to in Section
5.
A summary of generated instance information may be seen in Table 9. As in Section C.2,
instance types are labelled according to n, e.g., S100 is the instance type containing instances
where n = 100. Columns 3 and 4 show the mean number of stable matchings |M|av and
mean number of rotations |R|av, respectively. Figure 6 (associated with Table 10) shows a bar
chart of the mean number of stable matchings occurring for the six different types of optimal
stable matching described above, with increasing n. Finally, Figure 7 (associated with Table
11) shows a bar chart of the mean number of stable matchings that satisfy different numbers
of optimal stable matching criteria, with increasing n. Both of these bar charts show a
reduced selection of n with n ∈ {100, 400, 700, 1000} (the tables show the full data).
We note the following additional results:
Balanced and sex-equal stable matchings: In all plots of Figure 2, balanced and sex-equal
stable matchings have remarkably similar mean scores over all instance sizes and all
measures. This may be due to the similar nature of these optimality measures, where
both measures involve a calculation over the cost of matchings (recall that the balanced
objective involves minimising the maximum of the total cost for the men and the total
cost for the women, whilst the sex-equality objective involves minimising the absolute
value of the difference between the total cost for the men and the total cost for the
women). This similarity was previously noted by Manlove [15, pg. 110], who references
work undertaken by Eric McDermid to find an instance of smi in which no balanced
stable matching is also a sex-equal stable matching.
Frequency of different types of optimal stable matchings: From Figure 6, we can see a clear
ordering for the three most frequent types of degree-based optimal stable matching. From
most frequent to least frequent they are minimum regret, regret-equal and min-regret sum
stable matchings. The minimum-regret stable matching may be most frequent because
this optimality criterion is somewhat less constrained than the other two, as it is based
only on the worst performing agent. In contrast, the regret-equal and min-regret sum
stable matchings are based on the worst performing man and worst performing woman.
Additionally, cost-based optimal stable matchings are likely to be more constrained than
degree-based ones (due to the number of different costs and degrees possible for stable
matchings of any n), which may account for the very low average number of stable
matchings for these types.
The number of optimality criteria that stable matchings satisfy: The bar chart in Figure
7 shows a clear pattern of fewer stable matchings satisfying higher numbers of optimality
criteria. For smaller instances there is a trend for this to level out somewhat, which
can be seen more clearly for the instance types with lowest n in Table 11. Taken to
extreme, if there is only one stable matching in an instance, it will necessarily satisfy
all optimality criteria. Thus as n increases, so too does the number of stable matchings
and it is therefore less likely that higher numbers of optimality criteria are satisfied by a
particular stable matching.
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Case n |M|av |R|av
S10 10 3.0 1.8
S20 20 6.7 4.2
S30 30 10.3 6.3
S40 40 16.1 8.9
S50 50 21.0 11.2
S60 60 27.7 13.7
S70 70 33.1 15.8
S80 80 40.8 18.1
S90 90 48.0 20.4
S100 100 54.8 22.7
S200 200 139.2 42.4
S300 300 219.1 58.9
S400 400 348.4 76.2
S500 500 442.5 90.3
S600 600 546.2 105.7
S700 700 670.5 118.8
S800 800 815.2 132.5
S900 900 977.0 144.0
S1000 1000 1077.5 156.7
Table 9 General instance information.
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Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimum
regret
Regret-
equal
Min-regret
sum
Type of optimal stable matching
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Figure 6 Bar chart of the mean number of stable matchings for different types of optimal
matchings, for n ∈ {100, 400, 700, 1000}.
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Figure 7 Bar chart of the mean number of stable matchings which satisfy different numbers of
optimal stable matching criteria, for n ∈ {100, 400, 700, 1000}.
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Case Balanced Sex-equal Egalitarian Minimumregret Regret-equal
Min-regret
sum
S10 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.4
S20 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.7 1.7
S30 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.7 1.9 1.8
S40 1.0 1.0 1.1 3.3 2.3 2.1
S50 1.0 1.0 1.1 3.9 2.7 2.4
S60 1.0 1.0 1.1 4.7 3.3 3.0
S70 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.9 3.3 2.8
S80 1.0 1.0 1.1 5.4 3.5 3.3
S90 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.3 4.3 3.3
S100 1.0 1.0 1.1 7.1 4.4 3.7
S200 1.0 1.0 1.0 11.2 7.1 6.3
S300 1.0 1.0 1.0 16.3 9.7 8.8
S400 1.0 1.0 1.0 18.1 11.9 10.3
S500 1.0 1.0 1.0 23.7 15.8 13.1
S600 1.0 1.0 1.0 30.0 17.5 15.2
S700 1.0 1.0 1.0 33.2 20.3 19.0
S800 1.0 1.0 1.0 35.1 21.2 16.4
S900 1.0 1.0 1.0 48.6 28.2 21.2
S1000 1.0 1.0 1.0 47.7 24.5 20.2
Table 10 Mean number of optimal stable matchings per instance.
Case 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
S10 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
S20 3.2 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
S30 5.9 1.7 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1
S40 10.6 2.3 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1
S50 14.7 2.8 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.0
S60 20.0 3.6 2.6 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
S70 25.0 4.1 2.7 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0
S80 32.0 4.2 3.3 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0
S90 37.9 5.1 3.6 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0
S100 43.8 5.8 3.5 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.0
S200 121.5 9.9 6.0 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
S300 194.4 14.1 8.4 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.0
S400 319.5 17.3 9.2 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
S500 404.3 23.5 12.5 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
S600 501.3 26.4 16.3 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0
S700 620.7 29.1 16.0 4.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
S800 765.0 28.8 17.7 3.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
S900 905.8 44.5 23.8 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.0
S1000 1008.5 45.8 20.3 2.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Table 11 Mean number of stable matchings that satisfy c optimality criteria, where c varies on
the x-axis.
